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LAW'S PERSPECTIVE OF RELIGION
AND ITS VIEW OF THE STATE
CHRIST, CULTURE, AND COURTS: A NIEBUHRIAN
EXAMINATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
Michael W. McConnell*
Lawyers naturally think about the set of issues we call "church
and state" on the assumption that legal principles - principally the
religion clauses of the First Amendment - are the primary, per-
haps the only, normative authority to which we can refer for the
organizing principles of society.' We develop various formulations
(such as the Lemon test,' the "wall of separation,"' or the "compel-
ling interest test"4 ) and we believe that American society, including
the churches, should act in accordance with these legal understand-
ings. Thus, when churches act in a way that does not conform to our
legal conceptions - take the example of Catholic bishops excom-
municating state legislators for voting in favor of abortion rights -
we complain that this endangers democratic values, threatens the
separation of church and state, or violates some other principle of
* William B. Graham Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. The author wishes
to thank friends and colleagues for helpful comments on an earlier draft: Albert Alschuler, Angela
Carmella, Alan Freeman, Abner Greene, Elena Kagan, Lawrence Lessig, Robin Lovin, Elizabeth
Mensch, Michael Perry, and Daniel Ritchie. This Essay builds upon an oral presentation made at
the Bicentennial Conference on the Bill of Rights sponsored by The Center for Church/State
Studies, DePaul University College of Law, held in Chicago on December 6 and 7, 1991.
1. I refer here to "normative authority" rather than to power. In ordinary times, there is little
doubt that civil government has the power to enforce its will over the church. But lawyers and
religionists share the assumption, which I explicitly adopt here, that there is a difference between
power and authority. It is the latter with which I am concerned.
2. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
3. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). "In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion was intended to erect 'a wall of separation' between church and
State." Id.
4. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
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conduct conceived in constitutional terms. The church is conceived
as having a limited right of self-determination - a subordinate nor-
mative authority - within a civil order constituted by the
Constitution.
This obviously cannot be the perspective of religion. We should
render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things
that are God's.' But everything belongs to God, and only some
things to Caesar. From the perspective of religion, the question is:
How far does the normative authority of the world extend, and how
can this be reconciled with the normative authority of the church?'
The Constitution is addressed to "Congress"; it does not purport to
lay down rules of conduct for the church. This is not to say that the
religious perspective requires defiance of the law, for in most reli-
gious traditions the law has a certain authority. Caesar's domain is
not inconsequential. But it is to say that bodies of believers will
reach judgments about these matters on their own: there is no natu-
ral subordination of faith to law.7
In this Essay, I attempt to view the law of church and state not in
terms of the familiar legal categories, but in light of the ways in
which the various communities of believers have understood the re-
lation between spiritual and temporal authorities. I will treat the
communities of believers, constituted by nonlegal sources of norma-
tive authority, as the primary actors and assume that the law re-
sponds to their choices, rather than the other way around. In so
5. Mark 12:17.
6. A particular religious tradition might come to the conclusion that the function of the church
is properly dictated by the civil authorities. See infra note 157 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of Erastianism. But if God is the ultimate sovereign, it is more common to conclude that
the functions of God's church cannot be demarcated in any fundamental sense by civil authorities.
The spirit blows where it will. John 3:8.
7. Lest the reader consider this statement dangerously anarchic and un-American, see James
Madison's argument in the Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, which
the Supreme Court has treated as the single most authoritative source for understanding the
meaning of the religion clauses of the First Amendment:
It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as
he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is precedent both in order of time and
degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society.
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reprinted in THE
MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 5, 7 (Marvin
Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981). (emphasis added) [hereinafter Memorial and Remonstrance]. The
Memorial and Remonstrance is also reprinted as an appendix to Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1, 63 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). "[R]eligion," Madison continued, is "exempt
from the authority of the Society at large." Memorial and Remonstrance, supra; see also Ever-
son, 330 U.S. at 65.
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doing, I make no claim that this is a "better" way to analyze the
questions of church and state. I claim only that adoption of this
perspective casts some light. For the most part, therefore, the Essay
will be descriptive rather than normative. I will not praise, criticize,
or analyze legal doctrines, but instead take a close look at what
judges and believers have had to say about the relation of religious
communities to public life.8
The classic work providing a taxonomy of relations between reli-
gious communities and the public sphere from a theological perspec-
tive is H. Richard Niebuhr's Christ and Culture.' In this book,
Niebuhr describes five forms of interaction between the Christian
church and the wider society, and examines their theological justifi-
cations and roots in church history. I will use his taxonomy to order
the analysis. I will then examine legal sources, primarily opinions of
the United States Supreme Court, to explore how the legal system
has responded to these models.
The nature of the inquiry requires that I make some modifications
to Niebuhr's analysis. As explained in more detail below, two of
Niebuhr's models can be treated together because their legal impli-
cations are closely related. One of Niebuhr's models must be divided
into two. More fundamentally, Niebuhr's analysis is directed to the
Christian church while my legal analysis must be directed to a plu-
ralistic society. Thus, instead of "Christ" we must talk of religious
communities, and be aware that the various religious communities
of the United States provide different answers to the questions of
how to live a righteous life. I will use the shorthand expression
"church," but readers should understand that I speak of a church,
indeed many churches, not of the Church, and that I include in this
expression not just Christian but Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist,
Native American, and other religions as well. For the most part, I
will speak in the theological language of Christianity. This is not to
exclude other faiths from the discussion but to give the discussion
concreteness. I assume that any religion that makes comprehensive
normative claims on its adherents will face the same problem of rec-
onciling those claims to the normative claims of the wider culture,
8. In an excellent essay published after this Essay was composed, Angela Carmella uses Rich-
ard Niebuhr's taxonomy as a starting point for a critique of current constitutional doctrine. See
Angela C. Carmella, A Theological Critique of Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 782 (1992).
9. H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, CHRIST AND CULTURE (1951). My thanks to Daniel E. Ritchie, of
Bethel College, for introducing me to this work years ago.
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and that the possible answers must bear some resemblance - even
if they are not identical - to the answers Niebuhr has identified in
the Christian tradition.
Following Niebuhr, I will use the term "culture" to denote the
public sphere, the organized community. By this I mean something
more than the government and something less than the sum of eve-
rything that goes on. Culture, in this sense, does not include the
"private" - what we do and believe in our own homes and
churches. But it includes the institutions that shape the normative
understandings of the community, even when they are not, strictly
speaking, "government." An analogy might be drawn to what is
often called, especially in Eastern Europe, "civil society." When it is
relevant to distinguish between the state and the culture, I will
make this clear in the particular context.
I. CHURCH APART FROM CULTURE
Niebuhr's first model of the relation between the normative
claims of religion and society is what he calls "Christ Against Cul-
ture."1 Under this model, the world is considered to be irremedia-
bly sinful and to have no normative authority whatsoever. Christians
are driven to choose between Jesus and the world; one cannot have
allegiance to both. Those who follow this understanding are called
"radical" or "exclusive" Christians because their Christianity repre-
sents a total rejection of the world.
As it relates to the legal system, the posture of religious exclusiv-
ity can manifest itself in two quite different forms. The religious
community can either withdraw from the world or it can fight with
the world. I therefore have divided Niebuhr's category into two:
"Church Apart From Culture" and "Church In Conflict With Cul-
ture." When churches see themselves as apart from culture, they
seek to separate themselves from the wider society, culturally and
sometimes even physically. The members of the community typi-
cally do not vote or hold office, or otherwise seek to participate in
public life. All they ask of the outside world is to be left alone. They
do not seek to influence the world directly, except by prayer and
conversion, since there.is no hope that the unregenerate will escape
the snares of the world without the saving grace of God.
Niebuhr traces this ideal in the Bible to the First Letter of
10. Id. at 45-82.
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John," which advises Christians: "Do not love the world or the
things in the world. If any one loves the world, love for the Father is
not in him,"1 2 and in patristic thought to Tertullian.' s Its great his-
torical exemplar is the medieval monastic movement.'4 According to
this ideal:
The state and Christian faith are simply incompatible; for the state is based
on love of power and the exercise of violence, whereas the love, humility,
forgiveness, and nonresistance of Christian life draw it completely away
from political measures and institutions .... Against [the evil of the state]
there is no defense except complete nonparticipation, and nonviolent striving
for the conversion of all men to peaceful, anarchic Christianity. 8
This conception of relations between church and culture is rela-
tively easy for the legal system to accept. It corresponds roughly to
the legal metaphor of the "wall of separation" between church and
state (though without the secularistic bias that the metaphor fre-
quently seems to import). It points toward a view of the religion
clauses with a strong establishment as well as a strong free exercise
component. In essence, the public sphere should be entirely "secu-
lar," unaffected by religious principles - and in return, religious
communities will be protected from assimilation by exceptions and
accommodations. In its mild form, this is the perspective of many
traditional civil liberties organizations. 6 Carried to its logical ex-
treme, it suggests that religious persons are not, and cannot be, full
citizens. They cannot participate in public life, for their religious
perspective is barred from the secular state, and they are not bound
by the obligations of the law. They are strangers in a strange land."
The leading example of a religious group taking this perspective
in the annals of the Supreme Court is Wisconsin v. Yoder. 8 At is-
sue in Yoder was whether teenagers from the Old Order Amish
community could be required to attend school beyond the eighth
grade.'9 The Amish are the quintessential separatist community.
11. Id. at 46-48.
12. John 2:15.
13. NIEBUHR, supra note 9, at 51-55.
14. Id. at 56.
15. Id. at 61. Here, Niebuhr is summarizing the thoughts of Tolstoy, whom he considers illus-
trative of radical Christianity in the modern era.
16. For a recent defense of the position, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal De-
mocracy, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 195 (1992).
17. See Hebrews 11:9, :13.
18. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
19. Id. at 207-O.
19921
DEPA UL LAW RE VIEW
According to the Court's description, "Old Order Amish communi-
ties today are characterized by a fundamental belief that salvation
requires life in a church community separate and apart from the
world and worldly influence." 0 The Amish do not participate in
public life and do not wish to be influenced by it. They view the
outside world - "the English" - as an alien culture. The reason
the Amish opposed education beyond the eighth grade in Yoder was
that it would "exposfe] Amish children to worldly influences in
terms of attitudes, goals, and values .... 21 Since the very conflict
between the church and the state in Yoder was over the legitimacy
of the Amish decision to remain separate - and to keep their chil-
dren with them - this illustrates the willingness of our legal system
to accept the "Church Apart From Culture." The Supreme Court
held unanimously that the Amish have a constitutional right to pro-
tection from being "assimilated into society at large .... ,2 The
legal system can accept the proposition that a religious community
is a self-contained unit with the right to set its own norms, so long
as - in the Court's words in Yoder - it "interferes with no rights
or interests of others .... 2
Not many religious communities adopt so radical a separation
from the world. But many religious traditions take a less extreme
version of the same position. They treat personal faith and piety as
the central feature of religion, neither allowing the mores of the
wider culture to affect their way of life nor attempting to affect the
wider culture (except through prayer and evangelism). The posture
is one of live and let live. This attitude typically characterized Prot-
estant fundamentalism from its birth as a self-conscious religious
movement in the early part of this century until its conversion to
political action in the middle of the 1960s.
So agreeable is this model of church-state interaction to the legal
mind that at times the Supreme Court Justices speak as if it were
the only appropriate model. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,2 4 the leading
case interpreting the Establishment Clause, Chief Justice Burger
wrote that "[tihe Constitution decrees that religion must be a pri-
vate matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of
20. Id. at 210.
21. Id. at 218.
22. Id. Justice Douglas's partial dissent did not depart from the unanimity of the reasoning on
this point.
23. Id. at 224.
24. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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private choice ... ."" This seemingly bland statement contains
two quite controversial propositions: that the Constitution, rather
than the independent decisions of individuals and communities, de-
termines what role religion is supposed to play in the lives of the
American people, and that this role is confined to the private sphere.
Significantly, the Court asserted these propositions in Lemon with-
out explanation or defense, as if they were obvious and
incontestable.
In Grand Rapids School District v. Ball,26 the Court expressed
the view that "religion throughout history has provided spiritual
comfort, guidance, and inspiration to many,""7 but that "it can also
serve powerfully to divide societies and to exclude those whose be-
liefs are not in accord with particular religions . "...  This reiter-
ates the theme that the role of religion is radically private - essen-
tially to provide comfort and inspiration for its members - and that
any wider role in the public sphere is inappropriate. Moreover, it
supplies a reason: religion (not just some religions, but "religion")
"can divide societies" and "exclude" those of other beliefs. This
statement makes excellent sense if the religious world view is radi-
cally discontinuous from the perspectives of the rest of the commu-
nity - if the church is "apart from culture." But there is nothing
inevitable about this exclusivist conception of religion.
As will be seen, it is equally possible to understand religion as an
organic part of the culture, sharing and contributing to many of its
deepest beliefs and presuppositions. Under that view, the Court's
statement would be difficult to understand. Every group, institution,
and ideology shares some presuppositions of the wider culture; at
the same time every group "divides" the society and "excludes"
those of other beliefs. Yet the Court would never say that the par-
ticipation of a secular group or ideology in public life would "serve
powerfully to divide societies and to exclude those whose beliefs are
not in accord," even if it is true. In treating religion as especially
likely to be divisive and exclusionary, the Court implicitly adopts
the view that the church is apart from the culture in a more radical
sense than is true of other communities of belief.
There are signs that this understanding of church-state relations
25. Id. at 625.
26. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).




is fading. In recent cases the Supreme Court has been more willing
to accept religious participation in public programs and civic life.
The other side of the coin is that the Court is increasingly unwilling
to shelter the internal activities of religious communities from
outside force. In Employment Division v. Smith,29 the Court sanc-
tioned criminal regulation of Native American religious ceremonies
that occur far from population centers and that apparently do not
affect outsiders." In Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of
Equalization," the Court agreed that the state can collect sales and
use taxes when a religious ministry distributes Bibles, sermon tapes,
and evangelistic literature to its adherents 2 In Jones v. Wolf, the
Court held that state courts are not necessarily required to decide
intrachurch property disputes in accord with the religious communi-
ties' own rules but may import "neutral principles of law" from the
wider culture. 4 As the Court seems less committed to imposing
separationism on religious communities that are involved with the
culture, it also seems less tolerant toward religious communities that
choose to be separate. It is not clear that Wisconsin v. Yoder would
be decided the same way today.35
II. CHURCH IN CONFLICT WITH CULTURE
The second model of relations I call "Church In Conflict With
Culture." Under this model, the religious community adheres to val-
ues and ideals antithetical to those of the wider culture, and sees
itself as a counterweight to the (im)moral authority of the state.
One hears the language of "spiritual warfare" against the "powers
29. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
30. Id. at 890.
31. 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
32. Id. at 397.
33. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
34. Id. at 602.
35. Justice O'Connor has espoused a theory of the First Amendment that overlooks the
"Church Apart from Culture" model of church-state relations. She takes the position that the
Establishment Clause should be interpreted to forbid "endorsements" of religion, on the ground
that "[elndorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of
the political community, and an accompanying rfiessage to adherents that they are insiders, fa-
vored members of the political community." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). This presupposes that members of minority religions want to be "in-
siders." Sometimes they do. But an equally important aspect of religious liberty is to allow the
religious community to be outsiders. Justice O'Connor's formulation does not take into considera-
tion the fact that the church sometimes prefers to remain apart from culture.
[Vol. 42:191
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and principalities" of the world.3" From Niebuhr's theological per-
spective, this model is indistinguishable from the first, "Church
Apart From Culture," in that the religious community totally re-
jects the normative authority of the world and lives in radical com-
mitment to the authority of Christ. But from a legal or political
perspective the two appear almost as opposites. Under the separatist
model, the religious and the political communities live in peaceful
coexistence, neither attempting to convert the other. Under the con-
flict model, the two are adversaries, concerned about many of the
same issues and competing for the loyalties of the citizens.
In other ages and in other lands, church-state interaction has fre-
quently been characterized by deadly conflict. During the Middle
Ages, the armies of the pope and of the Holy Roman Emperor (the
"Guelphs" and the "Ghibellines") fought for control of Rome over a
period of many years; the Investiture Controversy and the martyr-
dom of Becket represented the attempt of civil authorities to control
the church; popes used their powers of excommunication (even over
entire nations) to assert authority over the civil rulers. In recent
times, the communist governments of Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union were committed, at least in principle, to the destruction of
religion and of the church as an institution; and the church was the
hardiest element of the opposition. The accession of a Polish pope,
which created an alternative center of authority for the Polish na-
tion, was a powerful factor in the unraveling of the Communist re-
gime. Figures such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Archbishop Os-
car Romero, and the Dalai Lama have played similar roles in other
regimes.
In marked contrast to their tolerant attitude when those with rad-
ically different religious value systems keep to themselves, the courts
invariably side with the state and allow the government to use its
coercive power to crush religious opposition when they perceive that
the church is attempting to hold to its norms not just as a matter of
quiet internal governance, but as a challenge to the legitimacy of
the rules of the state.
A recent example involves the so-called sanctuary movement, in
which churches assisted undocumented aliens from El Salvador to
enter the United States illegally in defiance of the immigration
36. See Ephesians 6:12 ("For we are not contending against flesh and blood, but against the
principalities, against the powers, against the world rulers of this present darkness.").
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laws.8 7 The movement did not confine itself to a passive refusal to
cooperate with the authorities. Rather, a prominent leader of the
movement, a Presbyterian minister, announced that the church
"'can no longer cooperate with or defy the law covertly as we have
done,' "8 organized demonstrations, and actively sought media pub-
licity for the movement's effort to frustrate enforcement of the
law.39 Even "applying the most exacting scrutiny, ' 40 the court of
appeals rejected the movement's claim of constitutional protection,
and the participants were convicted of criminal violations. This re-
sult was inevitable, because when churches become active opponents
of government they must expect the government to treat them as
such. "Live and let live" has two sides. As the court noted, "'[t]he
statute under which [defendants] were convicted is part of a com-
prehensive, essential sovereign policy. We cannot engraft judicial
exceptions .... ",
A contrasting case involving a similar religious conviction may
seem to undermine the claim that the legal system is more willing to
tolerate "Church Apart From Culture" than it is "Church Against
Culture," but this impression turns out to be mistaken. In American
Friends Service Committee v. Thornburgh,42 the institutional body
of the Quaker Church sought a free exercise exemption from the
requirement that employers assist in the identification and expulsion
of illegal aliens."' In their complaint, the church officials stated that
they "do not challenge Congress' authority to make rules for the
admission of aliens to citizenship and to control the national bor-
ders," but only to "their 'conscription' as border guards which vio-
lates their free exercise rights."" Notwithstanding the church's pos-
ture as simply wishing to remain uninvolved with government
policy, their claim was rejected by the federal courts." This may
seem to contradict my analysis. The court of appeals implied, how-
37. See United States v. Aguilar, 871 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 1989) (involving the criminal prose-
cution of defendants for smuggling or transporting Central American refugees into the United
States).
38. Id. at 1442 (quoting a March 9, 1982, newspaper interview with the minister).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1468.
41. Id. at 1469 (quoting United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 956 (5th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 942 (1987)),
42. 718 F. Supp. 820 (C.D. Cal. 1989), affd, 941 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1991).
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ever, that a different result might have been reached under free ex-
ercise doctrine prior to Employment Division v. Smith."' Since
Smith represents the very recent trend toward abandonment of
strong free exercise protection even for the "Church Apart From
Culture," this does not, therefore, undermine the argument here. In-
deed, the contrast between the opinion in the sanctuary case, which
rejects the church's claim even under the "most exacting scrutiny,"
and the opinion in the American Friends case, which suggests the
church would have won under a higher standard of review, confirms
my analysis.4 7
Another telling example is the treatment of religious conscien-
tious objection to the draft. Since before the Revolution, American
governments have exempted religiously-motivated pacifists from
conscription."8 Such persons represent a markedly different moral
vision but pose no serious challenge to the government's policy.
Thoroughgoing pacifism is an otherworldly posture, and few in the
wider culture would treat it as a viable option for the United States
this side of utopia. The state can exempt pacifists from the draft in
recognition of their personal convictions without suffering a serious
challenge to the moral authority of the state. The situation is quite
different with regard to those who conscientiously object to partici-
pation in a particular war on the ground that it is unjust. These
objectors present a direct challenge to the moral authority of the
government, since the calculus that would lead an individual be-
liever to the conclusion that a war is unjust is no different, in princi-
ple, from the calculus that Congress and the President must conduct
46. See 941 F.2d at 810.
47. Even under Smith, the American Friends case should have been resolved in favor of the
church for three reasons. First, institutional autonomy stands on a different constitutional footing
than do the claims of individual conscience governed by Smith; a church cannot be required to
conduct its own hiring in a manner that conflicts with its religious doctrine. For an explanation,
see Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Crit-
ics, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 685, 725-26 (1992). Second, while churches may be required, under
Smith, to refrain from legal violations, the institutional separation of church and state argues
against allowing the state to enlist churches as active enforcers of the law. Third, since the em-
ployer sanctions imposed by the law contain exceptions in recognition of hardships faced by inde-
pendent contractors, household employers, and employers of persons since November, 1986, the
government may be under an obligation to accommodate the much greater burden on religious
employers whose faith demands that they welcome strangers and aliens. Had the American
Friends case been properly decided, the result would contrast even more sharply with that in the
sanctuary case.
48. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1468-69 (1990).
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in deciding to go to war. Accordingly, it is not surprising that Con-
gress has refused to exempt objectors of this sort, nor that the Su-
preme Court has upheld this policy.49 When Catholic believers in
just war doctrine held that the Vietnam War was an unjust war,
this made a position of mutual respect and coexistence between reli-
gion and government all but impossible. The objectors went to jail.
The distinctive feature of these cases is that the religious commu-
nity insisted not only that it was obliged to adhere to a standard of
conduct that differs from the government's, but that the wider soci-
ety should conform to the religious standard as well. The sanctuary
movement and the just war opponents to the Vietnam War did not
share the vision of the monastics or the Amish, that the religious
community is governed by the commands of God and the rest of the
world by its own natural sinfulness. Rather, they believed that the
commands of God apply to the entire society and that it is their
responsibility, as Christians, to uphold His authority. In the ensuing
struggle between church and culture, the law stands on the side of
the culture.
This is not meant as a criticism of the courts. How could they act
otherwise? The courts are an arm of the state. To be sure, they are
the arm of the state most receptive to the claims of individuals and
outsiders and least committed to enforcement of the political pro-
gram of the state. But when the moral authority of the state is gen-
uinely challenged on a matter of importance, there is no doubt on
which side the courts will come down. Churches are permitted to
preserve their own value systems (within limits) so long as they re-
main apart from culture. When they engage in conflict with the cul-
ture they must expect to find the courts arrayed against them as
part of the apparatus of the state, and the Constitution of no
assistance.
Even when the religious community tries to keep to itself, the
state will often treat it as an adversary if the disagreement is over
one of the fundamental tenets of the official culture. I suspect this is
because of a fear that the mere existence of a community living
according to a different creed will undermine the attempt of the
state to order the society. Perhaps the most dramatic example was
the late nineteenth-century conflict between federal authorities and
the Mormon Church over the issue of polygamy. At the high point
49. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (upholding the conviction of defendants
for failing to report for duty in the armed forces during the Vietnam conflict).
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of the conflict, Congress passed and the Supreme Court upheld leg-
islation punishing those who obeyed Mormon ordinances regarding
marriage,50 revoking the legal charter of the Church and seizing its
property,5' and denying anyone who professed belief in Mormon
creeds the right to vote. 52
Two cases involving racial discrimination further illustrate the
point. In Berea College v. Kentucky,5" a religious college during the
heyday of Jim Crow laws was punished for disobedience to the
state's laws requiring segregation - and the Court took the side of
the state. More recently, in Bob Jones University v. United States,"
a religious college opposed to interracial dating was punished for
being in violation of "public policy" - and again the Court took the
side of the state.5 At one level, these results seem inconsistent; but
at another level they are of a piece. Society's values change, but the
primacy of the state over the religious opposition remains constant. 0
The decisive point in Bob Jones University was that the religious
community challenged the correctness of a moral conviction to
which the legal and political system is deeply committed, and on
which the prestige of the modern Supreme Court is largely based.
The Court repeatedly emphasized that eradication of racial discrim-
ination in education is "a most fundamental national public pol-
icy '57 and that the contrary practice of Bob Jones University "vio-
lates deeply and widely accepted views of elementary justice. '5 8
50. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
51. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1
(1890).
52. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
53. 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
54. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
55. Id. Analysis of the case is complicated by the fact that it involved revocation of tax-exempt
status, rather than direct criminal or civil sanction, and there are hints in the opinion that a direct
sanction might not be constitutional. Id. at 603-04 ("Denial of tax benefits will inevitably have a
substantial impact on the operation of private religious schools, but will not prevent those schools
from observing their religious tenets."). In other contexts, however, denial of tax benefits for the
exercise of constitutional rights is treated as equivalent to direct sanction. Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513, 518 (1958) ("To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech
is in effect to penalize them for such speech. Its deterrent effect is the same as if the State were to
fine them for this speech.").
56. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
57. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 593; see also id. at 592-94 (referring repeatedly to "funda-
mental public policy"); id. at 604 ("[T]he Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in
eradicating racial discrimination in education. ... ).
58. Id. at 592; see also id. at 598-99 (referring to "an educational institution engaging in prac-
tices affirmatively at odds with this declared position of the whole Government").
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Justice Jackson once wrote that "freedom to differ is not limited to
things that do not matter much." 59 The actual practice of the Court
belies his statement. Whenever religious communities (or other
sources of dissent from official policy) challenge the government on
an issue that "matters much" to the government, the dissidents lose.
I know of no exception.
Il1. CHURCH ALIGNED WITH CULTURE
Niebuhr's next category is "The Christ of Culture."6 Under this
model, Christians identify their values with the "finest ideals, th[e]
noblest institutions, and th[e] best philosophy" of the culture."'
Those who follow this understanding Niebuhr calls "cultural Chris-
tians."" 2 Cultural Christians "feel no great tension between church
and world, the social laws and the Gospel, the workings of divine
grace and human effort, the ethics of salvation and the ethics of
social conservation or progress."' 63 On the one hand, according to
Niebuhr, "they interpret culture through Christ, regarding those el-
ements in it as most important which are most accordant with his
work and person . "64 On the other hand, "they understand
Christ through culture, selecting from his teaching and action as
well as from the Christian doctrine about him such points as seem
to agree with what is best in civilization."6 5 They present the faith
not in opposition to, but in light of, the intellectual and moral cur-
rents of the day.
Under this model, the religious community evolves in consonance
with the fundamental normative understandings of the wider cul-
ture. The church is monarchical in the age of kings and democratic
in the age of democracies. When Darwin's theory of chance varia-
tion and natural selection becomes widely accepted among scientists,
the church adjusts its interpretation of the book of .Genesis. When
the equality of women gains popular acceptance in the wider cul-
ture, the church opens its positions of-leadership to women and em-
braces feminism as part of its doctrine. The ethical pronouncements
of the church and of the New York Times editorial page are difficult
59. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
60. NIEBUHR, supra note 9, at 83-115.
61. Id. at 103.
62. Id, at 104.
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to tell apart. The church is aligned with the culture. The church
remains distinctive as a community of worship, but it has no distinc-
tive ethics. 66
Moreover, the influence runs both ways. The church is understood
to be one of the most important determinants of the culture. Church
bodies issue policy statements on the great issues of our time, and
they expect to be treated as moral authorities - in effect, as the
ethical specialists for the culture. They do not see themselves as
outside critics, but as the voice of conscience of the community, ex-
pressing the highest ideals of our culture.
The position of "Church Aligned With Culture" is not incompati-
ble with the role of the social or cultural critic, for cultural Chris-
tians frequently see their position as in opposition to the vulgar at-
tributes of the wider society. According to Niebuhr:
The cultural Christians tend to address themselves to the leading groups in
a society, they speak to the cultured among the despisers of religion; they
use the language of the more sophisticated circles, of those who are ac-
quainted with the science, the philosophy, and the political and economic
movements of their time.6 7
Thus, in a society characterized by cultural divisions and conflict,
one might find cultural Christians on both sides of the conflict: some
adhering to the cultural norms of the many, some adhering to the
cultural norms of the elite. In modern American society, we see ex-
amples of both.68
Niebuhr traces the "Christ of Culture" to the earliest days of the
Hebrew church, which "sought to maintain loyalty to Jesus Christ
without abandoning any important part of current Jewish tradi-
tion,"' 9 and later to the Gnostics.7" The position flowered when the
Roman Empire became Christian. Christianity was merged with the
insights of Greek philosophy to produce the impressive intellectual
synthesis of the High Middle Ages.71 With the Enlightenment came
efforts such as Locke's The Reasonableness of Christianity72 and
66. Id. at 88-89.
67. Id. at 104.
68. Niebuhr identifies elements of cultural Christianity in a wide variety of theological posi-
tions, including liberal Protestantism, fundamentalism, Marxian Christianity, and cultural Cathol-
icism. Id. at 102-03.
69. Id. at 85.
70. Id. at 85-89.
71. Niebuhr particularly associates the position with Abelard. Id. at 89-90.
72. JOHN LOCKE, THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY AS DELIVERED IN THE SCRIPTURES
(George W. Ewing ed., 1965).
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Kant's Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone.73 The move-
ment reached its climax, according to Niebuhr, 4 with the era of
cultural Protestantism, which lasted in the United States at least
until the Second World War. During this time, mainline Protestant-
ism was the dominant influence on American political and cultural
life, and the conviction that faith and culture are compatible domi-
nated Protestant theology.
It seems inevitable that the law would be ambivalent about the
legitimacy of the "Church Aligned With Culture." On the one
hand, insofar .as the law is based on the shared beliefs and traditions
of the people, there is no way to avoid the fact that in many re-
spects, the law will coincide with and reflect religious beliefs. As
Justice Douglas said for the Supreme Court in Zorach v. Clauson,75
"[W]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Su-
preme Being."'76 On the other hand, the constitutional commitment
to an official equality among religious denominations makes close
identification between government policy and any one religious tra-
dition problematical.
Constitutional arguments regarding the alignment of church and
culture were presented most. directly in Harris v. McRae,77 the liti-
gation challenging the constitutionality of legislation prohibiting the
use of federal Medicaid funds for the performance of abortions.
Among other arguments, opponents of the law contended that Con-
gress's decision "incorporates into law the doctrines of the Roman
Catholic Church concerning the sinfulness of abortion and the time
at which life commences,''78 in violation of the Establishment
Clause requirement that laws have a "secular purpose." The Court
rejected this argument, reasoning that a statute does not violate the
Establishment Clause "because it happens to coincide or harmonize
with the tenets of some or all religions."" 9 More interestingly, the
Court commented that the refusal to fund abortions "is as much a
reflection of 'traditionalist' values towards abortion, as it is an em-
bodiment of the views of any particular religion." ' This suggests
73. IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON ALONE (1934).
74. NIEBUHR, supra note 9, at 94.
75. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
76. Id. at 313.
77. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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that when church becomes so aligned with culture that it appears to
be an inseparable part of the "tradition," the distinction between
worldly values and religious tenets ceases to exist. Since on many -
maybe most - moral questions the church is aligned with the cul-
ture, it is not fruitful to attempt to confine the laws to secular
premises.
The alignment of church and culture can also be seen in coopera-
tion between governmental and religious institutions to achieve a
goal they have in common. Bowen v. Kendrick8 is a recent, forth-
right recognition of this model. In Kendrick, the Court approved the
use of religiously-affiliated grantees in a program designed to dis-
courage teenage pregnancy by encouraging sexual self-discipline.8 2
The lower court had held that this was unconstitutional since the
issues of sexual morality and religion could not be disentangled. 3
This did not concern the five-Justice majority of the Supreme Court,
which noted that "[o]n an issue as sensitive and important as teen-
age sexuality, it is not surprising. that the Government's secular con-
cerns would either coincide or conflict with those of religious institu-
tions."8 ' Indeed, the Court thought it "quite sensible for Congress to
recognize that religious organizations can influence values ...."-15
Nor was the involvement of religious organizations in a government-
funded program a violation of the Constitution. The Court noted
approvingly that there is a "long history of cooperation and interde-
pendency between governments and charitable or religious organiza-
tions . ,,*"86 In other words, the Court found it not "surprising"
that the church would be aligned with the culture on sensitive and
important questions of moral conduct, "sensible" for Congress to
recognize and support the role of the church in influencing values,
and appropriate for church and government to have a relationship of
"cooperation and interdependency."
Similarly, in Lynch v. Donnelly,87 the Court concluded that inclu-
sion of a nativity scene in a city's December holiday display was not
unconstitutional, essentially because the religious aspects of Christ-
81. 487 U.S. 589 (1988). The author argued the case as counsel for intervening parents in
support of the program.
82. Id. at 593.
83. Id. at 598-99.
84. Id. at 612-13.
85. Id. at 607.
86. Id. at 609.
87. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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mas are a legitimate part of the way this culture celebrates the sea-
son 8 8 Even Justice O'Connor, whose opinion has received more
favorable reviews in the literature than that of the majority, reached
essentially the same conclusion on the ground that a "long-stand-
ing" and "non-sectarian" symbol does not communicate a message
of endorsement.8 9 If this makes sense at all, it must be on the
ground that when a religious tradition is intertwined with the cul-
ture for so many years that it ceases to be noticed as "sectarian," it
has a legitimate place in the public sphere.
Needless to say, this model of church-state interaction is contro-
versial. To many legal minds, the role of religion becomes problem-
atic precisely when it becomes aligned with culture. Since no more
than one religion or group of religions can be so thoroughly assimi-
lated, this gives the churches that are so aligned a privileged status
in our culture. Thus, in Grand Rapids School District v. Ball9 0 the
Court held that "the symbolic union of government and religion in
one sectarian enterprise ...is an impermissible effect under the
Establishment Clause."9" In Edwards v. Aguillard9 2 the Court held
that it is unconstitutional for the public school curriculum to be tai-
lored to reflect the religious convictions of one of the major religions
of the State - something other ideological interest groups (from
environmentalists to AIDS activists to Afrocentrists) routinely strive
to achieve. Religion is special. The Constitution is held to require
the government to hold the more prominent religions of its people at
arms length - to create a distinction between church and public
culture.93
It is one thing to recognize that, as a matter of empirical fact,
there exists a substantial degree of alignment between the public
culture and the values of the mainstream religions of the United
States, and another thing to decide whether this presents a constitu-
tional problem. Under one point of view - that reflected in Harris
v. McRae94 and Bowen v. Kendrick9 - it is not only normal but
unavoidable in a democratic society that the government will reflect
88. Id. at 687.
89. Id. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
90. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
91. Id. at 392.
92. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
93. Id. at 593-97.
94. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
95. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
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the values of the mainstream, which in this case is religious. Under
another point of view - that reflected in Grand Rapids School Dis-
trict v. Ball96 and Edwards v. Aguillard 7 - part of the counterma-
joritarian thrust of the Constitution is to sever the links between
official government action and the religious provenance of the ma-
jority's values.
IV. CHURCH ACCOMMODATED BY CULTURE
Niebuhr's next two models of the relation between the normative
claims of religion and society he calls "Christ Above Culture"98 and
"Christ and Culture in Paradox." '99 The theological differences be-
tween these positions are profound, but the constitutional and legal
arrangements that they entail are sufficiently similar to warrant
combined consideration here.
The former position is similar to "Christ of Culture," in that be-
lievers accept the ordinary morality and natural reason of the cul-
ture insofar as they go. But they also recognize obligations to a
higher standard, not based on the values of the secular world. The
demands of the two spheres are of a different nature, but are not in
conflict. The Christian will be the best of citizens, and something
more. He "must .. .first of all be a good man in accordance with
the standard of good culture. Sobriety in personal conduct is to be
accompanied by honesty in economic dealings, and by obedience to
political authority."'10 But he will also be self-sacrificing, forgiving,
and humble, and pursue the "life of love of God for His own
sake."'' Niebuhr calls those who follow this understanding "syn-
thetic Christians" because they seek to adhere to both Christian val-
ues and the values of the world, in full recognition of the difference
between these values. The synthesist "neither seeks to reinterpret
the figure of Jesus so as to make him wholly compatible with the
speculative systems of the day, nor does he reject as worldly wisdom
the philosophy of the [wider culture]."'02 Niebuhr associates this
position especially with Clement of Alexandria"'0 and Thomas
96. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
97. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
98. NIEBUHR, supra note 9, at 116-48.
99. Id. at 149-89.
100. Id. at 127.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 128.




"Christ and Culture in Paradox" is based on the proposition that
the Christian cannot escape his attachment to the sinful world and
owes it a certain allegiance, but that the demands of the world and
the demands of God are in inherent tension with one another.
"[M]an is seen as subject to two moralities, and as a citizen of two
worlds that are not only discontinuous with each other but largely
opposed."' 0 5 The only ultimate resolution of this struggle is redemp-
tion through the death and resurrection of Jesus. Those who follow
this understanding. are called "dualists," since they emphasize the
conflict between the City of God and the City of Man. As Niebuhr
explains, "the dualist joins the radical Christian in pronouncing the
whole world of human culture to be godless and sick unto death"'0 6
but "the dualist knows that he belongs to that culture and cannot
get out of it.' 0 7 Niebuhr associates this position especially with the
Apostle Paul'0 8 and Martin Luther.' 9
These perspectives, more than the others, lie at the intellectual
foundation of the First Amendment. Niebuhr comments that
"[d]ualism appears in practical measures and theoretic justifications
for the separation of church and state." 1 0 Citing Roger Williams as
"the symbol and example of such dualism in America," Niebuhr
describes Williams as "reject[ing] the synthetic and conversionist
attempts of Anglicanism and Puritanism to unite politics and the
gospel, both because the union corrupted the gospel by associating
spiritual force with physical coercion, and because it corrupted
politics by introducing into it elements foreign to its nature.""' The
demands of civil and spiritual kingdoms are not the same, but the
individual is a citizen of both.
The jurisprudence of the Free Exercise Clause can be seen as the
legal response to the dualist and synthetic models of interaction be-
tween faith and civil society. From a constitutional point of view,
"Christ Above Culture" states the ideal: the American polity should
be such that every citizen can be a full and equal participant in civil
104. Id. at 128-37.
105. Id. at 43.
106. Id. at 156.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 159-67.
109. Id. at 170-79.
110. Id. at 183.
111. Id.
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society without being forced to sacrifice his religious identity. Inso-
far as government is responsible for creating worldly norms that
conflict with religious dictates, the objective of the constitutional or-
der is to reduce the degree to which "Christ and Culture" are "In
Paradox." Thus, Madison argued that those entering into the social
contract do so with a "reservation" of their "allegiance to the Uni-
versal Sovereign." '112 By restricting the powers of government, the
United States would minimize the tension between the demands of
earthly and spiritual authority. I call this model "Church Accom-
modated By Culture" because the central question it addresses is
how the government can reduce the conflict between civil and spiri-
tual authority by making special accommodations of religion.
Modern First Amendment law presents three different answers to
the accommodation question: (1) that accommodation is required to
the maximum degree consistent with the compelling interests of the
state (particularly maintenance of public peace and order); (2) that
the political branches are permitted to pursue a policy of accommo-
dation, but are not required to do so by the Constitution; and (3)
that the Constitution forbids accommodation of religion.113
The first position prevailed in the Supreme Court from at least
1963 until 1990. The leading case was Sherbert v. Verner.1 4 Sher-
bert involved a Seventh-Day Adventist who lost her job and was
unable to find another, on account of her unavailability for work on
Saturdays."' Under state law, unemployment compensation is not
provided to persons who refuse to accept "suitable work" when it is
offered.' The worldly standard required work, and the religious
standard required rest on the sabbath. Both standards had author-
ity, but the two were in conflict. The Supreme Court responded to
this situation by holding that the state could not structure its unem-
ployment compensation system in such a way as to force the believer
"to choose between following the precepts of her religion and
forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other
112. Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 7; see also Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1, 64 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
113. For my analysis of the legal issues, see McConnell, supra note 47, at 685; Michael W.
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUnP. CT. REV. 1.
114. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
115. Id. at 399-400.
116. Id. at 401.
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hand."' 17 Rather, the state was forced to accept religiously-moti-
vated refusals to accept employment as within the category of "good
cause.""' So defined, the state law ceased to conflict with the reli-
gious requirement, and the claimant was able to live in obedience to
both.
In 1990, the Supreme Court abandoned this interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause in Smith," 9 holding that the Constitution
"does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a
'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that
the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes).' "120 In that case, a state law prohibited
ingestion of peyote, which is part of the central religious ceremony
of the Native American Church. 2' The Court held that the state is
under no obligation to create an exception or accommodation for
this religious use.'2 2 This position is not based on a disagreement
about the desirability of accommodation as a governmental practice,
but on the institutional question of which branch of government -
legislature or judiciary - should make decisions of this sort. After
Smith, accommodation is not a constitutional right, but a matter of
legislative policy; legislatures are free to make religious exemptions
or accommodations if they wish. "[T]o say that a nondiscriminatory
religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desira-
ble, is not to say that it is constitutionally required .. "..23 Thus,
in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 21 the Court upheld a statute
exempting religious organizations from the provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 that prohibit discrimination on the basis of reli-
gion. The Court stated that "it is a permissible legislative purpose to
alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability of re-
ligious organizations to define and carry out their religious
"1125missions.Some commentators argue that accommodation of religion is un-
117. Id. at 404.
118. Id. at 401.
119. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
120. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
121. Id. at 874-76.
122. Id. at 890.
123. Id.
124. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
125. Id. at 335.
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constitutional under the Establishment Clause. 12 6 This position is
difficult to summarize in a few words, but it rests fundamentally on
the proposition that the law ceases to be impartial when it makes
exceptions for particular citizens on account of their private beliefs.
As Justice Frankfurter put it in his dissenting opinion in the flag
salute case, "[t]he constitutional protection of religious freedom ter-
minated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave reli-
gious equality, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from con-
formity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law
because of religious dogma.' 2 7
One can see this position as a denial that the First Amendment
has any relevance to the problem posed by religious dualists. If be-
lievers are able to synthesize the authorities of church and state,
that is fine; if not, it is their problem.
From the theological' perspective of "Christ and Culture in Para-
dox," the Frankfurterian anti-accommodation position has much to
commend it. The tension between faith and law, according to this
perspective, is "the fundamental and ever-present situation,"128 for
"[a]ll human action, all culture, is infected with godlessness
.... ,"129 The feeble attempts of government to accommodate reli-
gious convictions cannot rectify, but can only disguise, this situation.
Indeed, there is something unseemly about approaching the seat of
government to ask for an accommodation, for the central feature of
the godly life is refusal to flinch from living out the implications of
the paradox. The believer's willingness to suffer the earthly conse-
quences is to the glory of God. No one ever said that following the
cross would be without cost.
Yet the legal perspective must be different. The spiritual implica-
tions of dualism are beyond the jurisdiction of the law, but the civil
consequences are not. From a certain theological perspective, dual-
126. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of
Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75 (1990);
Mark V. Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court":" Kurland Revisited, 1989 Sup.
CT. REV. 373; cf. Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Dis-
cretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PENN. L. REV. 555 (1991) (arguing that legisla-
tive accommodation of religion is unconstitutional and that accommodation of religious institu-
tions is never permissible, but that some limited accommodations of individual claims of religious
exercise are constitutionally required).
127. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 653 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
128. NIEBUHR, supra note 9, at 153.
129. Id. at 154.
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istic - hence divided - loyalties may be beneficial, but from a civil
perspective, divided loyalties can only weaken the commonwealth.
"It degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opin-
ions in Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative authority,"
to borrow Madison's language. 130 It is much better, from the legal
perspective, to reduce such tension where possible, so that persons of
many different faiths are equally welcome to live out their lives in
harmony, not struggle, with the rest of the community. It is one
thing for the believer to affirm that obedience to God's will imposes
costs; it is something else for the believer's fellow citizens to say that
they will be the instruments of penalty and punishment. It may be
unseemly for the believer to ask for accommodation. It is not un-
seemly for his fellow citizens to provide it.
V. CHURCH INFLUENCING CULTURE
Niebuhr's fifth model is called "Christ the Transformer of Cul-
ture."' 31 This is based on the proposition that the church can be a
blessing to the world by reconciling it to the divine will. Under this
conception, the church as the body of Christ continues the work of
the incarnation; it is the Word of God made flesh and dwelling
among men, bridging the gap between a holy God and a sinful
world. " ' Those who follow this understanding Niebuhr calls "con-
versionists." The conversionist's view of the relation between faith
and culture is similar to that of the dualist, but where the dualist
stresses the need to live in paradox until God recreates the worldly
order, the conversionist seeks to reclaim and uplift the world. Their
difference, then, is not in their understandings of the faith, but in
their views of the corrigibility of the culture. Under the conversion-
ist view, the "culture is all corrupted order rather than order for
corruption . . . .It is perverted good, not evil; or it is evil as perver-
sion, and not as badness of being."' 33 The "problem of culture is
therefore the problem of its conversion, not of its replacement by a
new creation .... 134 Niebuhr states that conversionism represents
"the great central tradition of the church,"' 35 and associates it in
130. Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 7, at 10-11.
131. NIEBUHR, supra note 9, at 190-229.
132. See id. at 192-93.
133. Id. at 194.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 190.
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particular with the gospel of John' and the teachings of Augustine
and Calvin.
This model, which I call "Church Influencing Culture," is ex-
tremely familiar to anyone acquainted with the American political
experience. From the American Revolution 137 through abolitionism
and temperance, to today's controversies over nuclear war, civil
rights, abortion, and welfare, the churches have been among the
most visible participants in debates over public justice.3 8 The
church is neither so closely aligned with the culture that it fails to
be critical nor so disaffected from the culture than it must either
fight or drop out. Under this model, the religious community and its
members are fully as entitled as their fellow citizens to participate
in public life and work to achieve their ideals in the public sphere.
As the Court noted in Walz v. Tax Commission: 9 "Adherents of
particular faiths and individual churches frequently take strong po-
sitions on public issues including . . . vigorous advocacy of legal or
constitutional positions. Of course, churches as much as secular bod-
ies and private citizens have that right.' ' 40
The strongest judicial statement on behalf of this model of
church-state interaction is Justice Brennan's concurrence in McDan-
iel v. Paty."'I McDaniel involved a state law that barred members
of the clergyfrom legislative office. 142 The law was defended on the
theory that this would "prevent those most intensely involved in reli-
gion from injecting sectarian goals and policies into the lawmaking
process, and thus . . . avoid fomenting religious strife or the fusing
of church with state affairs . "14,3 Justice Brennan responded
that this position "manifests patent hostility toward, not neutrality
respecting, religion . . . ."'4 He recalled that "church and religious
groups in the United States have long exerted powerful political
136. Id. at 196-206. "God so loved the world that he gave his only Son, that whoever believes
in him should not perish but have eternal life. For God sent the Son into the world, not to con-
demn the world, but that the world might be saved through him." Id. at 197 (quoting John 3:16).
137. A particularly interesting source is POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING
ERA: 1730-1805 (E. Sandoz ed., 1991).
138. See RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE 1980s'
(Mark A. Noll ed., 1990); ROBERT B. FOWLER, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA (1985); A.
JAMES REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE (1985).
139. 397 U.S. 664 (1971).
140. Id. at 670.
141. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
142. Id. at 620.




pressures on state and national legislatures, on subjects as diverse as
slavery, war, gambling, drinking, prostitution, marriage, and educa-
tion."' 45 According to Brennan, "[r]eligionists no less than members
of any other group enjoy the full measure of protection afforded
speech, association, and political activity generally. The Establish-
ment Clause . . . may not be used as a sword to justify repression of
religion or its adherents from any aspect of public life."'"
In a similar vein, Justice Scalia has noted that "political activism
by the religiously motivated is part of our heritage.'' 7 "We surely
would not strike down a law providing money to feed the hungry or
shelter the homeless if it could be demonstrated that, but for the
religious beliefs of the legislators, the funds would not have been
approved." ' " He commented that "[t]o do so would deprive reli-
gious men and women of their right to participate in the political
process.' 49
More frequently, however, the courts have treated religious in-
volvement in the formation of public policy as presumptively unde-
sirable. According to the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 50 "political
division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against
which the First Amendment was intended to protect . . . . The po-
tential divisiveness of such conflict is a threat to the normal political
process.""'s' Thus, until recently, the mere existence of political divi-
siveness was treated as an independent ground for holding aid to
religiously affiliated organizations unconstitutional, and even now it
can be treated as "evidence" of a constitutional violation.' 52 That is
a powerful deterrent to religious participation in politics.
The most radical position in opposition to religious influence on
public policy can be found in the argument that otherwise constitu-
tional legislation must be struck down if it is predicated on religious
teachings. In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,5 3 Justice
Stevens observed that the "intensely divisive character of much of
145. Id. at 641 n.25.
146. Id. at 641.
147. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 615 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148. Id,
149. Id.
150. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
151. Id. at 622.
152. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Political divisiveness
... may be evidence that . . . a government practice is perceived as an endorsement of
religion.").
153. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
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the national debate over the abortion issue reflects the deeply held
religious convictions of many participants in the debate," '154 refer-
ring to amicus briefs submitted by some sixty-seven different reli-
gious organizations in the case, on both sides of the abortion ques-
tion. Given the theological nature of the abortion debate, Stevens
argued that the state legislature could not "inject its endorsement of
a particular religious tradition into this debate" '155 - thus sug-
gesting that the Constitution insulates the political process from the
influence of the church. He did not explain how - given the pres-
ence of religious groups on both sides of the issue - the state could
avoid endorsing one side or the other.
In academic circles, the proposition that civil law must not be
based on religious arguments is remarkably common, embracing
such names as Rawls, Dworkin, Nagel, Ackerman, Sullivan, and
(for a time) Tribe.156 The Supreme Court, however, has never ac-
cepted this proposition, and it is difficult to see how - in a demo-
cratic polity in which many of the citizens look to religious sources
for guidance about questions of public justice - it could ever be
employed systematically as a legal principle.
VI. THE NEGLECTED MODELS: "CHURCH CONTROLLING
CULTURE" AND "CULTURE CONTROLLING CHURCH"
It is somewhat surprising that Niebuhr neglects to discuss two
models of the relation between Christianity and culture that have
been prominent in the past even if not much in evidence today. Per-
154. Id. at 3085 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
155. Id.
156. See KENT R. GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 30-84
(1988) (describing but not endorsing the positions of John Rawls, Bruce Ackerman, and Thomas
Nagel); Sullivan, supra note 16; Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights; Whether and How Roe
Should be Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 421-25 (1992); Laurence H. Tribe, Foreword:
Toward a Model of Rules in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 22-26
(1973); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-14, at 1275-84 (2d ed.
1988) (modifying or abandoning earlier position). Professor Michael Perry responds to the pro-
position in his recent work, MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND
MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991). For an argument that Perry does not go far enough,
see David M. Smolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in a Postmodern America: A
Response to Professor Perry, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1067 (1992). For an argument that Perry goes too
far, see Edward B. Foley, Tillich and Camus, Talking Politics, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 954 (1992).
See also ELLIS SONLOz, A GOVERNMENT OF LAWS: POLITICAL THEORY, RELIGION, AND THE
AMERICAN FOUNDING (1990); Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, The Politics of Virtue: Ani-
mals, Theology, and Abortion, 25 GA. L. REV. 923 (1991); Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall
of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse. 140 U. PENN. L. REV. 149, 180-87 (1991).
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haps Niebuhr found both positions so unattractive that they did not
warrant discussion. One such model is theocracy: the view that the
church is entitled to control civil society. For parallelism, this might
be called "Church Controlling Culture." It differs sharply from the
model considered in the preceding section ("Church Influencing
Culture") because in a theocracy a single church has actual political
authority, whereas in the preceding model the various faith commu-
nities have only the power to persuade. The other - sometimes
called "Caesaro-Papism," or in the English tradition "Erastian-
ism"'1 57 - is the view that the church is subordinate to the civil
authorities. It might be called "Culture Controlling Church." This
model exists, in mild form, in the Church of England, where the
Queen is the nominal head of the church and the Prime Minister
selects the Archbishop of Canterbury. Fear of this model was a pri-
mary motivating force behind the enactment of the Establishment
Clause and the disestablishment of religion in the various states. ,
The legal response to these models is clear: both are core viola-
tions of the religion clauses. 158 But since neither model has any sig-
nificant presence in the current climate of opinion, there is little oc-
casion for judicial enforcement of constitutional norms in these
contexts. The closest examples have been cases in which religious
organizations have wielded a kind of civil authority through owner-
ship of property, 59 and cases in which the government has seized
control of church assets to prevent alleged fraud.' 60
CONCLUSION
It is evident that the Court has not settled upon any one model of
church-state relations. Under different circumstances, the Court em-
157. See Weldon S. Crowley, Erastianism in England to 1640, 32 J. CHURCH & STATE 549
(1990).
158. There are exceptions to everything. The Erastian model seems to have its modern expres-
sion in the military chaplaincy, which has been upheld against constitutional challenge. Katcoff v.
Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985). It is understandable that in the military, where all life is
regimented, even religion would be under official military control. In the absence of military chap-
lains, the men and women in the armed services might be denied the opportunity for religious
worship.
159. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (holding unconstitutional a
statute granting the governing bodies of churches the power to prevent the issuance of liquor
licenses to establishments within close proximity to church property).
160. See, e.g., People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Worldwide Church of God, Inc., 178 Cal. Rptr.
913 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that it was unconstitutional for a state-appointed receiver to
assume control of a church's assets to ensure that they were properly used).
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braces different models, seemingly without recognizing the inconsis-
tencies. Even individual Justices take sharply different positions
under different circumstances. Is it possible to do better?
At first blush, it would appear that the first and second models,
"Church Apart From Culture" and "Church In Conflict With Cul-
ture," present lesser establishment difficulties than the others. It is
not plausibly an establishment of religion for the government to re-
frain from interfering with the internal beliefs and practices of a
separatist religious community. The difficulties arise only when the
state chooses to treat this model of church-state relations as the only
appropriate form of church-state interaction, or when the religious
community seeks to enter the wider culture without forfeiting its
protections. Similarly, the model of "Church in Conflict With Cul-
ture" bears little resemblance to establishment. One of the great
contributions of religion to politics is to foster dissent from majority
will. One thinks of churches standing for abolition of slavery, in op-
position to child labor, in support of desegregation in the South, in
opposition to unjust wars, and in favor of hospitable treatment of
aliens. For churches to serve as a moral counterweight to govern-
ment obstructs authoritarianism. The only legal question here is to
what extent the Free Exercise Clause serves as a shield for religious
communities in opposition to the government. Of course, the
churches sometimes defend positions that seem repugnant - at
least to the majority. The price of maintaining the independence of
churches to resist unjust governmental action is that they will have
the independence to resist just governmental action as well.
The third and fifth models, "Church Aligned With Culture" and
"Church Influencing Culture," are generally thought to be the most
troublesome. The ideal of a secular state runs deep; a majority of
Americans believes that religion and politics do not mix. Yet the
connections between the "Church Aligned With Culture," the
"Church In Conflict With Culture," and the "Church Influencing
Culture" are close enough to warn against too quick a condemna-
tion. If the church may dissent from public policy - as virtually
everyone agrees - does it not follow that the church may also influ-
ence government policy? If the great political contribution of reli-
gion is to dissent from unjust governmental action (that is to say,
governmental action that the religious community thinks is unjust),
then it would be paradoxical to contend that the wider society could
not be persuaded, or that successful persuasion violates the
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Constitution.
But if the society may be persuaded sometimes, can there be any-
thing wrong if religions that the majority of the people find persua-
sive influence public policy on a wide range of issues? If the govern-
ment gives no institutional advantage to mainstream churches, is
there any problem if those churches find themselves aligned with the
culture, and hence with the state? If the vast majority of Americans
is affiliated, at least loosely, with religion, how could their religiously
informed conceptions of right and wrong help but guide them in
their capacity as citizens?
The fourth model, "Church Accommodated By Culture," has
raised serious academic questions,"'1 most of which I consider mis-
guided.' 62 The most serious objection is that accommodations will
not be equal across denominations. But once it is recognized that
secular government policy can cause profoundly unequal effects
across denominations in the absence of accommodation, the objec-
tion ceases to have much force. It is an imperfect world, and we
should not let the best be the enemy of the good.
Richard Niebuhr's conclusion in Christ and Culture is that there
is no single Christian answer to the relationship of Christ and cul-
ture, and that the question must be left to "the free decisions of
individual believers and responsible communities. '11 3 This will be a
subject of intense debate within the various churches. Many a
church has been divided over whether and how to participate in de-
bates in the public arena. Niebuhr helps us to understand the
profound theological content of these debates.
By the same token, for the state to seek to impose one model of
church participation in public affairs would be a serious mistake.
The Establishment Clause forbids certain institutional connections
between government and religious institutions - most notably, pref-
erence for one religion over another, or religion over nonreligion.
But it does not purport to tell the churches of America what public
role to take, or the citizens of America how they should resolve the
conflict, if any, between the values of the culture and what they
perceive to be the demands of God. These issues represent funda-
mentally theological or ecclesiological choices, to be made by the
people in their capacities as believers and citizens - not by the law.
161. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
162. For my reasons, see McConnell, supra note 47.
163. NIEBUHR, supra note 9, at 233.
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Indeed, to presuppose or to impose one model can itself be seen as
an establishment of the corresponding theological position. Much of
the incoherence of Supreme Court doctrine may be traceable to the
Justices' assumption in particular cases that they understand the
proper relation between church and culture, and to read that under-
standing into the Constitution. They seem not to recognize that
their judgments reflect controversial ecclesiological presuppositions
as much as - or more than - a grounded understanding of the
law. The courts should recognize the existence and the legitimacy of
each of these models and leave to the churches and the culture the
choice among them. The First Amendment limits the power of the
state to intermeddle in religion, not the rights of religious persons as
believers and as citizens.
The religion clauses are framed on the premise that citizenship in
the nation is compatible with membership in the religious commu-
nity. The question arises: How can the rights and duties of citizens
be reconciled to the obligations and blessings of faith? In my view,
within broad limits, the best answer is that given by Niebuhr: We
must work it out for ourselves. The First Amendment does not an-
swer the question for us.
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